Homeland Security and Using Contact Tracing to Reduce Pandemics


National Security Strategy (NSS) is designed to protect the United States’ vital interests. The most vital of those interests is protecting American citizens and visitors. Throughout the history of the United States there have been numerous diseases and pandemics resulting in massive death. One tool that is part of the National Security Strategy (NSS) is contact tracing. This paper will define and explain the benefits and pitfalls of contact tracing, and how it can save lives. At the same time, contact tracing requires trust and a belief that information collected is confidential and not used as a part of a greater scheme.

Keywords: Central authority, contact tracing, Centers for Disease Control (CDC), Coronaviruses (CoVs), COVID-19, Incubation period, infectious period, isolation, law enforcement, privacy, public good, quarantine.

Homeland Security and Using Contact Tracing to Reduce Pandemics

Similar to other pandemics, the COVID-19 pandemic has impacted citizens around the world in

profound ways and in some respects this pandemic have caused greater damage than any the world has ever seen.  Because COVID-19 has impacted society in such a devastating way, it is more important than ever to recognize the benefits of “Contact Tracing” as part of the United States National Security Strategy (NSS).  However, the use of Contact Tracing is not without some concerns such as weighing the “public good” versus the right to privacy and maintaining the confidentiality of medical records and adhering to HIPPA.  Also, there are other serious issues as well to consider.


Coronaviruses (CoVs) are a big group of viruses that infect many mammals and birds. More specifically, COVID-19 is caused by a virus known as SARS coronavirus two that originated in bats and is the third coronavirus that has done this since 2002.  SARS is the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) CoV and originated in Guandgdong, China in 2002.  The second coronavirus was Middle Eastern Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) CoV and it is believed to have originated in the Middle East in 2012.  The third coronavirus is SARS-CoV-2 and according to researchers at Johns Hopkins University Bloomberg School of Public Health originated in Wuhan, China in 2019 (Gurley, 2020).  The common signs and symptoms for COVID-19 include fever where the temperature is >100.4◦ F, tiredness or fatigue, chills,

muscle pain, cough, loss of taste or smell, difficulty breathing, headache, and sore throat (Gurley, 2020).

Importantly, symptoms are something that people report, but cannot be objectively measured.  Nausea, loss of taste or smell, feeling tired are common examples of symptoms that cannot be measured objectively.  Fever on the other hand can be a sign and a symptom as it is measurable.  Unfortunately, fever, cough, and myalgia are nonspecific, but they are common in COVID-19 and other respiratory diseases (Gurley, 2020).

There are other signs and symptoms that indicate a disease (COVID-19) is progressing, and these include blue lips or face (this is indicative of a lack of oxygen), increased rate of breathing, shortness of breath, chest pain when breathing, waking up from sleep with shortness of breath, and new confusion or difficulty waking up (Gurley, 2020).  When people experience any of these signs or symptoms, they should seek immediate medical assistance.

Contact Tracing

Contact tracing is “the practice of identifying and monitoring individuals who may have had contact with an infectious person as a means of controlling the spread of a communicable disease” (Merriam-Wester, n. d.).  It is believed the first use of contact tracing is dated to the mid-19th Century in Europe and contact epidemiology “became a central public health strategy in the United States during the syphilis epidemic in the 1930s” (Gostin, 2008 p. 302). Kapa, Halamka, and Raskar (2020) state “the decision to deploy contact tracing at a regional, national, or global level needs to take into consideration a balance between individual data privacy and societal benefit” (p. 1).  Also, contact tracing can be viewed from two distinct vantage points.  The first utilizes user identification and emphasizes privacy.  This is commonly used and involves a “central authority” who gathers data and responds to the results of that data through direct contact with the user (who is identifiable) or through a law enforcement agency.  The second is where the user’s data is encrypted which prevents the “central authority” who never knows who the user is (Kapa, Halamka, and Raskar (2020).  In today’s society, the second approach is likely the preferred path for those who may be infectious and does not trust the central authority.  Therefore, “in scenario 2, no central authority or law enforcement body is aware of the identities of exposed individuals, but users can still be made aware of potential exposure and respond accordingly (pursuing testing or self-isolating) (pp. 1-2).

Contact Tracing Technology 

Unfortunately, citizens in the United States may be opposed to any technology that tracs their movements such as the type used in China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, or Europe even though many individuals may not realize they are tracked by Google, and other apps downloaded to their smartphones, even iPhones!  China was the first to use advanced technology and it was the close contact detector.  “Through the use of QR codes scanned by users and government identification numbers, the app integrates with the Ministry of Transport, China Railway, the Civil Aviation Administration, and the Chinese National Health Commission database” (Johns Hopkins, 2020, para. 3).  In the Republic of Korea, location data is the primary contact tracing approach.

The Corona Map and Corona 100m apps use date from government information systems, including those from the Korea Centers for Disease Control, to send push notifications if the user has been within a certain distance of a person known to be infected. (Johns Hopkins, 2020, para. 4).

The Republic of Korea system provides the recipient of push data with detailed information about the person the user was exposed to, the age, sex, and location of the exposure.  The system uses GPS data, history, and surveillance cameras to provide the detailed information.

Singapore takes a much different approach as they use “Bluetooth signaling between devices to detect users in close proximity” (para 5).  All the data is stored on the user’s device who can send the data to the Ministry of Health.  This system does not collect any location data.  According to the study by Johns Hopkins, the information collected by the app is deleted automatically after 21 days.  Currently, there is an effort under way in Europe to develop what is known as the GDPR-compliant platform “to enable contact tracing using an approach that enables full anonymity; this system is known as the Pan European Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (PEPP-PT) (para. 6). The European system is similar to that of Singapore and uses Bluetooth rather than geolocators.

In the United States there are several systems under development.  The first is COVID-19 Watch.  This system is being developed by Stanford University and uses Bluetooth.  The data is voluntary and are anonymized.  Additionally, “Bluetooth signaling: (2) heatmaps based on anonymized GPS data on locations of highest concentrations of cases to identify high-risk areas for transmission; and (3) generation of risk reduction strategies for health practitioners based on the data” (para. 8).  COEpi: Community Epidemiology in Action is another Bluetooth, voluntary technology which allows for self-reporting.  There is very little known about this system or the administrators of the company.

The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) developed Project Safe Paths.  This project involves participant experts from the United States, Canada, Germany, India, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Vietnam.  The system is an open-source technology and uses smartphone technology applications and a web application known as the PrivateKit appl.  Currently there are projections for at least two more versions which will include log location history, personal location history with infected people, and in V. 3 the ability to match one’s location history with encrypted anonymous redacted infected patient trace files provided by government officials (MIT, 2020).


                21-century technology has progressed to the point where at least on the issue of pandemics, contact tracing can be quicker and much more efficient.  One can only imagine how many lives would have been saved by the use of technology and contact tracing.  The Smallpox epidemic (1633-1634), Yellow fever (1793), three waves of Cholera 1832-1866, Scarlet fever (1858), Typhoid Mary (1906-1907), H1N1 Flu (1918), Diphtheria (1921-1925), Polio (1916-1955), H2N2 Flu (1957), Measles Second outbreak (1981-1991), Contaminated Water in Milwaukee (1993), Whooping cough (2010, 2014), HIV and AIDS (1980s to the present), and COVID-19 (2019-) could all have been less deadly through the use of contact tracing.  However, in the United States there are concerns that many people have related to confidentiality, privacy, and the possibility the law enforcement or social services could remove family members who have nowhere to go or anyone to take care of them.  Each jurisdiction (state) has their own guidelines and protocols which could result in such actions.



Gostin, L. O.  (2008).  Public health law: Power, duty, restraint.  Berkeley, CA: University of California Press

Gurley, E.  (2020).  COVID-19 Contact Tracing.  Johns Hopkins University School Bloomberg School of Public Health.  Retrieved from:


Johns Hopkins.  (2020 April 8).  Review of mobile application technology to enhance contact tracing Capacity of COVID-19.  Bloomberg School of Public Health Center for Health Security. 

Retrieved from: https://www.mayoclinicproceedings.org/article/S0025-6196(20)30424-9/pdf 

Kapa, S., Halamka, J., and Raskar, R.  (2020).  Contact tracing to manage COVID-19 – Balancing personal privacy and public health.  Retrieved from: https://www.mayoclinicproceedings.org/article/S0025-6196(20)30424-9/pdf

Merriam-Webster.  (2020).  Contact tracing.” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/contact%20tracing

MIT.  (2020). Project Safe Paths.  Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Retrieved from: https://www.media.mit.edu/projects/safepaths/overview/


Dr. Charles T. Kelly, Jr. received his Ph.D. in the Administration of Justice from the University of Southern Mississippi, a regionally accredited (SACS) Institution of Higher Learning in 2003. Dr. Kelly received a master’s degree in National Security from American Military University, master’s degree in Cyber Security Policy from the University of Maryland, master’s degree in Criminal Justice from the University of Alabama, and a bachelor’s degree in Criminal Justice from Loyola University. He selected USM at Hattiesburg, MS. for his doctoral degree because of the university’s wide-ranging doctoral studies approach and comprehensive requirements for doctoral students to concentrate on multiple academic disciplines. While at the University of Southern Mississippi, Dr. Kelly successfully completed arduous studies and specializations in the areas of Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, the Political Economy of Criminal Justice, Police Administration, Public Policy in Criminal Justice Agencies, Quantitative Analysis, Special Problems in Policing, and Grantsmanship. As a result of his multidisciplinary expertise, Dr. Kelly has been selected to teach classes in criminal law, research and statistics, police administration, police supervision and management, multi-cultural law enforcement, diversity in law enforcement, criminal investigations, interview and interrogation, corrections administration, corrections management and supervision, ethical leadership in criminal justice agencies, training and development in criminal justice agencies, and criminological theory. At present, Dr. Kelly serves as a member of the teaching faculty for Columbia Southern University and is the managing general partner for Security & Risk Assessment Consultants, LLC. (http://www.safeassessments.com/
Dr. Kelly began his teaching career in 1996 at Loyola University and has served on the teaching faculty of Tulane University, Southeastern Louisiana University, Southern University, Northwestern State University, and, Louisiana State University-Alexandria. LSU-A recruited Dr. Kelly to write their four-year criminal justice degree program and to prepare it for presentation to the Louisiana Board of Regents and the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (SACS). Dr. Kelly was also the Department Chair of Criminal Justice for Virginia College where he oversaw both the undergraduate degree program, graduate program, was Chairman of the Graduate School Committee, and Editor of the Journal of Law and Justice. He is widely published in the academic discipline of criminal justice and has authored such works such as:

Doctoral Dissertation University of Southern Mississippi (2003): COMMERCIAL BAIL: THE INEQUITABLE TAXING OF THE POOR IN LOUISIANA
Master’s Thesis University of Maryland (2016): Protecting Information Systems: Law Enforcement Technology


Dr. Kelly has also written and published journal articles that address contemporary issues in the law and justice profession which include:
• A Cross-Cultural Comparison of Police Personality” International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice,”
• “Katrina: An American Poseidon: Orleans Parish’s Disaster Response—Bifurcation and Chaos Theory, published in American Jail Magazine.

Dr. Kelly’s law and justice career is inclusive of a variety of senior management and command level positions. This demonstrative level of professional experience helps to provide him with unique insights into the requirements for professional education and the interrelation of academic curricula with professional training needs. Dr. Kelly rose to the rank of Major with the Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office and was assigned to the Office of the Chief Deputy as Confidential Assistant to the Chief Deputy. During the 1970’s he served with the New Orleans Police Department in the Sixth District and Urban Squad. In 1983, he joined the Orleans Parish Criminal Sheriff’s Office as a full-time sworn deputy sheriff working in the Warrants Division. Since his affiliation with the Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office he has held a variety of advisory, policy, and training positions and been responsible for leading efforts to modernize the department’s Policy and Procedure Manual; he also served in the POST Training Academy where he taught recruits, full-time deputies, and ranking officers in the areas of Ethics, Investigative Report Writing, Stress, and the legal issues associated with Use of Force.

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